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Provocation: the fall 
(and rise) of objectivity 
Kevin Kerrigan1
This article reviews the recent turbulent history of the partial defence of provocation. It assesses
the current state of the law, the continuing dissatisfaction among the judiciary and academic
commentators, and goes on to consider the current proposals for reform from the Law
Commission. In an attempt to retain the reader’s attention, it takes the form of a (wholly imagined)
exchange between a professor and student. Any similarity to any living person is wholly co-
incidental.........
Keen first year law student: Excuse me, can the Court of Appeal set aside a House of Lords
decision as to the proper construction of a statute? 
Impatient Professor: Of course not! The hallowed rules of precedent mean that the only court
that can reverse a decision of the House is the House itself.2 Why, their Lordships have only
recently re-asserted this principle in emphatic terms.3 Do keep up!
Student: So why didn’t the Court of Appeal in R v James; R v Karimi4 follow the House of Lords
decision in R v Morgan Smith?5
Professor: Er... 
Student: Perhaps it has something to do with the fact that the Privy Council in Attorney General of
Jersey v Holley6 overruled Morgan Smith. 
Professor: Tch! Everyone knows that the Privy Council can’t overrule a House of Lords decision. 
1 Principal Lecturer in Law, Northumbria University
2 See Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1
WLR 1234
3 Leeds City Council v Price [2006] UKHL 10: “[The
Practice Statement] was not intended to affect the use of
precedent elsewhere than in the House, and the
infrequency with which the House has exercised its
freedom to depart from its own decisions testifies to the
importance its attaches to the principle.” Readers of this
Journal will be familiar with the decision in IH (R (on
the application of IH) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2004] 2 A.C. 253) in which the House of
Lords endorsed the Court of Appeal’s decision to “set
aside” an earlier decision of the House of Lords, R. v
Oxford Regional Mental Health Tribunal Ex p.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1988]
A.C. 120. This was on the basis that the inability of a
Mental Health Review Tribunal to review a decision to
conditionally discharge a restricted patient gave rise to a
breach of Article 5(4) of the European Convention on
Human Rights. No discussion of the rules of precedent
arose in the IH case and the constitutional basis for the
Court of Appeal’s decision is not entirely clear. The
House of Lords in Price was very clear that certainty in
the law “is best achieved by adhering, even in the
Convention context, to our rules of precedent.” Price did
conceive of “very exceptional cases” where it may be
appropriate for a lower court to set aside a House of
Lords decision but the circumstances had to be
“extreme” for this to be permissible and the normal
approach would be to await determination of the matter
by the House of Lords itself. 
4 [2006] EWCA Crim 14.
5 [2001] 1 AC 146.
6 [2005] UKPC 23; [2005] 2 AC 580. 
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Student: I think it may be due to the fact there were 9 law lords sitting in Holley, all accepting that
they were ruling not only on the law of Jersey but also that of England and Wales. Apparently 6
of them decided that Morgan Smith wrongly interpreted the Homicide Act 1957 and preferred the
interpretation of the earlier Privy Council decision in the Hong Kong case of Luc Thiet Thuan v R.7
Professor: You mean to say you have actually read these cases to which you refer?
Student: Of course – haven’t you?
Professor: I, er, well... Hey this isn’t about me. I think it might be time for a bit of Socratic
dialogue. If you know so much about this, perhaps you could enlighten the rest of the class. For
starters, what part of the Homicide Act was under consideration?
Student: Oh that is easy. It is section 3 which deals with provocation, the partial defence to
murder:
“Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person
charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to lose his self-
control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did
shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury shall take into
account everything both done and said according to the effect which in their opinion, it would have
on a reasonable man.”
All the recent cases related to the so-called second limb of provocation. If the jury is satisfied that
the accused may have been provoked to lose his/her self control (the first limb) they must go on in
applying the second limb to assess whether the reasonable man would also lose his self control. 
It is the second limb that has caused all of the problems.
Professor: What was it about the second limb that was controversial?
Student: Well it is all to do with the old objective / subjective conundrum, isn’t it?
Professor: Go on... 
Student: You know; the question of whether the reasonable man referred to in the statute should
be an “objective” reasonable man or whether he should have some of the “subjective”
characteristics of the accused. 
Professor: What difference would it make?
Student: Assuming that the jury thought the accused had actually been provoked to lose his self
control when he killed the victim then, if the subjective approach won through, the jury would
take into account the accused’s own characteristics when deciding if a reasonable man would do
the same. In other words in assessing the reasonable man’s standard of self control he would have
the characteristics of the accused. 
So, for example, in Luc Thiet Thian the accused had brain damage; in Morgan Smith, he had severe
depression; in Holley he was an alcoholic; in James the accused had an unspecified psychiatric
condition that impaired his ability to control himself; in Karimi, he had post-traumatic stress
disorder. If the subjective approach was applied, the jury would assess the standard of self control
of the reasonable man with brain damage, with depression, with alcoholism etc. 
7 [1997] AC 131.
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Professor: Is that really tenable? Some conditions are surely incompatible with the concept of
reasonableness as commonly understood. How, for example, would the jury assess the reasonable
response of an accused suffering from schizophrenia?8
Student: With great difficulty I guess! Indeed, advocates of the subjective approach have suggested
that courts should not refer to the reasonable man at all. As Lord Hoffman stated in Morgan Smith:
“In my opinion, therefore, judges should not be required to describe the objective element in the
provocation defence by reference to a reasonable man, with or without attribution of personal
characteristics ... The jury must think that the circumstances were such as to make the loss of self-
control sufficiently excusable to reduce the gravity of the offence from murder to manslaughter. ...
In deciding what should count as a sufficient excuse they have to apply what they consider to be
appropriate standards of behaviour.”9
Thus the jury would be assessing whether, in light of the accused’s characteristics, including any
mental disorder, the response to the provocation should properly be excused in part. As Lord
Clyde put it, “whether the defendant exercised the degree of self-control to be expected of
someone in his situation”.10 The advocates of this approach felt that it would not remove the
objective nature of the test but it would accommodate the accused’s individual characteristics:
“Society should require that he exercise a reasonable control over himself, but the limits within
which control is reasonably to be demanded must take account of characteristics peculiar to him
which reduce the extent to which he is capable of controlling himself.”11
Critics of the subjective approach point out that it enables the accused to be judged not by the
uniform standard indicated by the statute but by his own standard. Lord Hobhouse in Morgan
Smith was searing in his criticism of the subjective approach:
“... this approach requires the accused to be judged by his own reduced powers of self-control,
eliminates the objective element altogether and removes the only standard external to the accused
by which the jury may judge the sufficiency of the provocation relied on. By introducing a variable
standard of self-control it subverts the moral basis of the defence, and is ultimately incompatible
with a requirement that the accused must not only have lost his self-control but have been provoked
to lose it; for if anything will do this requirement is illusory. It is also manifestly inconsistent with
the terms of section 3. It makes it unnecessary for the jury to answer the question which section 3
requires to be left to them, viz, whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do
as the accused did. It becomes sufficient that it made the accused react as he did. It substitutes for
the requirement that the jury shall take into account everything both done and said according to
the effect which in their opinion it would have on a reasonable man a different requirement by
reference to the effect which it actually had on the accused. These tests are in truth no tests at
all.”12
Professor: Okay – what about the objective approach?
Student: If the objective approach prevailed, then the jury would assess the reasonableness of the
accused’s response to the provocation by reference to a reasonable man of ordinary fortitude. They
8 For discussion of the conceptual difficulties inherent in
the objective standard see Alan Norrie, “From Criminal
Law to Legal Theory: the Mysterious Case of the
Reasonable Glue-Sniffer” (2002) 65(4) M.L.R. 538.
9 Op. cit. at page 173
10 Ibid. at page 155
11 Ibid. per Lord Clyde at page 179
12 Ibid. at page 208.
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would not be told about the accused’s peculiar characteristics insofar as they might affect his ability
to control himself.
Professor: So on the objective approach, the accused’s own characteristics are irrelevant?
Student: Hmm. Not entirely. Even on the objective approach the accused’s characteristics are
relevant to the gravity of the provocation. It is readily accepted that any particular idiosyncrasy of
the accused should be taken into account insofar as it might have made the provocative conduct
worse.13 In part this is a consequence of the 1957 Act expanding the definition of what could
amount to provocative conduct to include things said in addition to things done. If words could
suffice, then it followed that verbal provocation directed at a particular characteristic of the accused
should be taken into account by the jury in determining the reasonableness of the response. As
Lord Diplock put it in R v Camplin,14 the gravity of the provocation could depend on, “the
particular characteristics or circumstances of the person to whom a taunt or insult is addressed.”15
Professor: Let us be clear about this – on the objective approach if I have, say, epilepsy and
someone taunts me about it to the point where I stab him to death, the jury can take account of
my condition in deciding how reasonable it was for me to be provoked but not in deciding whether
I exercised reasonable self restraint?
Student: Exactly – they would hear evidence of your epilepsy when deciding how aggrieved you
would be by the taunts. This would clearly have some impact on the reasonableness of your
response. However, they would have to put out of their mind any impact your epilepsy might have
on your ability to control yourself. They should measure your response against their understanding
of how the ordinary person who did not have epilepsy would react. Lord Devlin in Camplin
suggested the following judicial direction:
“He should ... explain to them that the reasonable man referred to in the question is a person
having the powers of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of the sex and age of the
accused, but in other respects sharing such of the accused’s characteristics as they think would
affect the gravity of the provocation to him.”16
Professor: Wait a moment, you said earlier it was a “reasonable man” but now it is a person of the
age and sex of the accused. They are personal characteristics.
Student: Yes, I suppose they are. It could be argued that they are exceptions to the reasonableness,
test but Lord Nicholls in Holley argued they were no such thing:
“The powers of self-control possessed by ordinary people vary according to their age and, more
doubtfully, their sex. These features are to be contrasted with abnormalities, that is, features not
found in a person having ordinary powers of self-control. The former are relevant when identifying
and applying the objective standard of self-control, the latter are not.”17
Professor: Doesn’t the objective approach mean that many people would be incapable of satisfying
the standard expected precisely because they are not “normal”?
Student: Yes. Lord Nicholls acknowledged as much in Holley. He said that using the objective test,
“...may mean the defendant is assessed against a standard of self-control he cannot attain ... Inherent
13 R v Morhall [1996] AC 90.
14 [1978] AC 705.
15 Ibid. at page 717.
16 Ibid. at page 718.
17 Op. cit. at paragraph 13, emphasis in original.
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in the use of this prescribed standard as a uniform standard applicable to all defendants is the
possibility that an individual defendant may be temperamentally unable to achieve this standard.”18
Professor: Right, you have dawdled long enough. What did the cases decide then?
Student: In chronological order:
1997 – Luc Thiet Thuan – Privy Council – objective
2000 – Morgan Smith – House of Lords – subjective19
2005 – Holley – Privy Council – objective
2006 – James; Karimi – Court of Appeal – objective20
Professor: How did we get into this position in the first place? You said a moment ago that
Camplin21 established an objective test including a jury direction that referred to “ordinary”
powers of self control. Did Morgan Smith overrule Camplin?
Student: No. Bizarrely, despite adopting diametrically opposing views, both the majority and
minority in Morgan Smith claimed to be following the principles enunciated in Camplin. The
majority took the view that Lord Diplock’s speech in that case was not clearly indicative of a
wholly objective approach. Lord Hoffman argued that the references to the sex and age of the
accused were illustrative only and not intended to limit the relevant characteristics. Moreover, it
was argued that Lord Diplock had made no clear distinction between characteristics affecting the
gravity of the provocation and those affecting the accused’s powers of self control. Essentially
their Lordships in the majority employed a creative interpretation of the Camplin approach in
order to fit with their view as to the principles underpinning the law and the needs of justice.
This was a judgement reaching to the fundamentals of criminal liability. The majority was
concerned not just with practical difficulties with an objective test but with a perceived
incoherence in the strict doctrine that sidelined the concept of capacity for self-control when
considering provocation. Their Lordships were concerned that the law imposed a straightjacket
which required a strict demarcation between the respective defences to murder which was not
warranted by reality: 
18 Ibid. at paragraph 12. This has formed the basis of some
of the criticism of the objective approach: “It is to be
remembered that the House of Lords in R v G [2003]
UKHL 50 recently expressed grave concern about the
potential for injustice when objective standards are
employed, and thus in that case a significant step away
from the application of objective recklessness was taken.
In this context, a return to objectivity, albeit in a
different area of criminal law, seems incongruous.” Neil
Martin, “Continuing Problems with Provocation”,
N.L.J. 2005, 155 (7192), 1363.
19 There were a number of Court of Appeal decisions
preceding Morgan Smith which rejected the approach of
the Privy Council in Luc Thiet Thuan. These included
R v Campbell [1997] 1 Cr App R 199 and R v Parker
(unreported; 25 February 1997. Subsequently Morgan
Smith was applied in a number of Court of Appeal
decisions including: R. v Kimber (No.1), 2000 WL
1918494 R. v Lowe [2003] EWCA Crim 677; R. v
Miah [2003] EWCA Crim 3713; R. v Rowland [2003]
EWCA Crim 3636; R. v Smith 2000 WL 33122433; R.
v Farnell [2005] EWCA Crim 1021; R. v McCandless
[2001] N.I. 86.
20 Prior to the James/Karimi cases, a number of Court of
Appeal cases had suggested that Holley would be
followed in due course. In R v Van Dongen [2005]
EWCA Crim 1728 the Court of Appeal said, “We
assume, but do not decide, because it is not necessary to
do so, that Holley, a decision of the Privy Council,
would be taken as binding in England and Wales.” In R
v Faqir Mohammed [2005] EWCA Crim 1880 the
Court of Appeal said, “Although Holley is a decision of
the Privy Council and Morgan Smith a decision of the
House of Lords, neither side has suggested that the law
of England and Wales is other than as set out in the
majority opinion set out in the majority opinion
delivered by Lord Nicholls in Holley and we have no
difficulty in proceeding on that basis.”
21 Op. cit.
Provocation: the fall (and rise) of objectivity
49
“I think it is wrong to assume that there is a neat dichotomy between the ‘ordinary person’
contemplated by the law of provocation and the ‘abnormal person’ contemplated by the law of
diminished responsibility...”22
This ostensibly liberalising approach was heavily criticised outside the judicial arena as flawed in
principle in that it conflated the idea of provocation as a partial excuse with the idea of diminished
responsibility as a partial denial of responsibility:
“To offer an excuse ... is to attempt to provide a decent rational explanation for what one did. To
deny responsibility, by contrast, is to assert that (because at the time one was not a sufficiently
rational being) no rational explanation for what one did is called for. Defences in these two classes
... are not only different but incompatible. To make an excuse is not only not to deny one’s
responsibility; it is positively to assert one’s responsibility. To deny one’s responsibility is not only not
to make an excuse; it is to undermine any excuse one might have made. That is because one cannot
claim to live up to rationality’s standards while also claiming that one should not be judged by
rationality’s standards.”23
In other words the two partial defences to murder ought to be conceptually and morally distinct
but the subjective approach to provocation encouraged an unsustainable overlap between the
defences. Nevertheless the idea of integrating the two defences has also had its proponents. For
example, Mackay and Mitchell have argued strongly for the logic of the Morgan Smith decision to
be recognised explicitly by the creation of a single defence which combined elements of
provocation and diminished responsibility.24
Professor: But to come back to the current state of the law, you are saying that the majority view
in Morgan Smith has not prevailed and that the objective approach is now the correct test in English
law? 
Student: Yes.
Professor: And you say this is the case despite the decision coming from the Privy Council, which
is not even binding on English courts and despite the House of Lords decision being only 5 years
old?
Student: Just so. Professor Andrew Ashworth acknowledged it was a novel approach to the
development of the law but the reality was that Holley now represented the law:
“Is Holley binding on English courts? There may be a purist strain of argument to the effect that it
is not, since it concerns another legal system (that of Jersey). However, the reality is that nine
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary sat in this case, and that for practical purposes it was intended to be
equivalent of a sitting of the House of Lords. It is likely that anyone attempting to argue that
Morgan Smith is still good law in England and Wales would receive short shrift.”25
Professor: I don’t see what is wrong with being a purist, but putting that on one side, why did the
Privy Council think the House of Lords had misunderstood provocation?
22 Op. cit. note 5, above at page 168 per Lord Hoffman.
23 Gardner and Macklem, “No Provocation Without
Responsibility: A Reply to Mackay and Mitchell”,
[2004] Crim. L. R. 212. See also Macklem and
Gardner, “Compassion without respect? Nine fallacies
in R. v. Smith” [2001] Crim L. R. 622
24 Mackay and Mitchell, “Provoking diminished
responsibility: two pleas merging into one” [2003] Crim
L. R. 745. See also Mackay and Mitchell, “Replacing
Provocation: More on a Combined Plea” [2004] Crim.
L. R. 218.
25 Commentary, [2005] Crim. L. R. 966 at page 971.
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Student: Well the interesting thing was that the majority in Holley did not actually say there was
anything in principle wrong with the subjective approach in Morgan Smith. It was described as “one
model which could be adopted in framing a law relating to provocation”.26 The entire thrust of the
majority’s attack on Morgan Smith was to do with the proper interpretation of the statute and the
acceptable parameters of judicial interpretation. They believed the House of Lords had
misconstrued section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957:
“However much the contrary is asserted, the majority view [in Morgan Smith] does represent a
departure from the law as declared in section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957. It involves a
significant relaxation of the uniform, objective standard adopted by Parliament. Under the statute
the sufficiency of the provocation (“whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable
man do as [the defendant] did”) is to be judged by one standard, not a standard which varies from
defendant to defendant. Whether the provocative act or words and the defendant’s response met
the “ordinary person” standard prescribed by the statute is the question the jury must consider, not
the altogether looser question of whether, having regard to all the circumstances, the jury consider
the loss of self-control was sufficiently excusable.”27
This was based on the idea that the House of Lords in R v Camplin28 had definitively addressed the
implications of section 3 and had accurately identified an objective approach towards the standard
of self control required as follows:
“It means an ordinary person of either sex, not exceptionally excitable or pugnacious, but possessed
of such powers of self-control as everyone is entitled to expect that his fellow citizens will exercise
in society as it is today.”29
This view was entrenched by reference to Lord Diplock’s “model direction” in that case:
“He should ... explain to them that the reasonable man referred to in the question is a person
having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of the sex and age of
the accused, but in other respects sharing such of the accused’s characteristics as they think
would affect the gravity of the provocation to him; and that the question is not merely whether
such a person would in like circumstances be provoked to lose his self-control but also whether he
would react to the provocation as the accused did.”30
The law of homicide was said by the majority in the Privy Council to be a “highly sensitive and
highly controversial area of the criminal law” and that Parliament had altered the common law by
virtue of the Homicide Act. It was “not open to judges now to change (‘develop’) the common law
and thereby depart from the law as declared by Parliament.”31
The minority for its part emphasised the origins of the defence as a judicial response to the
harshness of the law of murder:
“It was a humane concession to human infirmity and imperfection, acknowledgement ‘that by
reason of the frailty of our nature we cannot always stand upright’... And the rationale of the
provocation defence is still the consideration of justice which gave rise to it, that the law should
‘not require more from an imperfect creature than he can perform’.”32
26 Per Lord Nicholls at paragraph 22.
27 Ibid..
28 Op. cit.
29 Ibid. Per Lord Diplock at page 717.
30 Ibid. at page 718, cited by Lord Nicholls in Holley at
paragraph 10; Lord Nicholls’ emphasis.
31 Holley, op. cit. at paragraph 22.
32 Ibid. per the joint dissenting opinion of Lords Bingham
and Hoffman at paragraphs 44–45.
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They agreed that the law relating to provocation required urgent review but so long as the defence
was available it ought to be applied in line with the underlying rationale. The statute could and
should be interpreted as requiring the jury to determine what matters to take into account in
determining the reasonableness of the response and it was improper to undermine the jury’s
function by limiting the characteristics that could be considered. Lord Carswell agreed and added
his concerns regarding the risk of confusing a jury:
“I hold the very clear view that the dichotomy between the gravity of the provocation and the level
of self-control in reaction cannot readily be made comprehensible to a jury by the directions
fashioned by a judge with the greatest care and clarity ... The formula is not only opaque ... but
even if it can be comprehended by an intelligent jury, they are more than likely to ask themselves
how they can sensibly decide whether an ordinary person would have reacted as the defendant did
if he would not have found the acts or words provocative in the first place.”33
The minority view in Holley thus echoed the majority view in Morgan Smith. It reflected a
determination to ensure the law of provocation did not demand a standard of control that was
beyond the capacity of defendants to perform. Ultimately the majority thought that irrespective
of the merits of the normative case for subjectivity, compliance with the statute required a return
to objectivity. 
Professor: So the subjective approach might be the right approach in principle but irrespective of
this, the Privy Council thought the House of Lords’ approach undermined the sovereignty of
Parliament?
Student: Yes, that is a fair assessment. The matter has now been taken beyond argument by the
Court of Appeal decision in R v James; R v Karimi which has endorsed the Privy Council decision
as reflecting the law of England and Wales. I won’t bother you with the constitutional acrobatics
the Court had to perform in order to recognise the pre-eminence of the Holley precedent, but the
Court did state:
“It seems to us that this can only mean that they [the minority judges in Holley] accepted that the
decision of the majority clarified definitively the present state of English law. ... While we do not
believe that it has any relevance to the resolution of these appeals, we should record that this court
finds the reasoning of the majority in Holley to be convincing.”34
I ought to re-emphasise though that despite the majority of the Privy Council being neutral on the
question of principle, numerous commentators have engaged in lengthy debate over the proper
approach towards the question of the standard to be required in the defence of provocation.35
Professor: Nevertheless, the law is now settled. Thank you for an adequate, if somewhat over
simplistic, assessment ...
Student: Er, sorry, that is not quite the end of the story. One thing that united all of their
Lordships in Holley was the fact that the law was now in something of a mess:
33 Ibid. at paragraph 73. The majority thought these fears
were “exaggerated” (paragraph 26).
34 Op. cit. note 4 above at paragraphs 25–26.
35 See for example Professor JC Smith, commentary at
[2000] Crim. L. R. 1004; Macklem and Gardner,
“Compassion without respect? Nine fallacies in R. v.
Smith” [2001] Crim L. R. 622; Alan Norrie, “The
structure of provocation” [2001] C. L. P. 307; Mackay
and Mitchell, “Provoking diminished responsibility: two
pleas merging into one” [2003] Crim L. R. 745;
Gardner and Macklem, “No provocation without
responsibility: A reply to Mackay and Mitchell” [2004]
Crim. L. R. 212. Most, but not all of the comment is
critical of the subjective approach.
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“In expressing their conclusion above, their Lordships are not to be taken as accepting that the
present state of the law is satisfactory. It is not. The widely held view is that the law relating to
provocation is flawed to an extent beyond reform by the courts ... Their Lordships share this
view.”36
The Law Commission in its “Report on Partial Defences to Murder”37 reviewed the rationale and
operation of the provocation defence and made recommendations for reform. The proposal
involved a new gender neutral partial defence for homicide committed in response to “gross
provocation”, fear of serious violence or a combination of both. The requirement for the accused
to have lost his/her self control was removed, although it would not apply where the accused acted
out of considered desire for revenge. In respect of the standard of self control, the Commission
preferred the approach of the minority in Morgan Smith (now supported by the majority in Holley)
which, it noted, also accorded broadly with the law in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.38 Thus
the new defence would only be available if “a person of the defendant’s age and of ordinary
temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-restraint, in the circumstances of the defendant
might have reacted in the same or a similar way.”39
In its consultation paper, “A New Homicide Act for England and Wales?”40, the Law Commission
provisionally proposed a new categorisation for murder whereby provocation would be a defence
to first degree murder (where the accused intended to kill) and reduce this to second degree
murder, not manslaughter. The principles would be the same as those outlined in the report on
partial defences.41 The Commission rejected the notion advocated by Mackay and Mitchell of
combining the defences of provocation and diminished responsibility.42
The upshot is that we are likely in due course to see the fundamental review of the law of murder
that has been widely called for. Whether this leads to a more coherent and workable defence of
provocation remains to be seen.43
Professor: Right. Time for lunch. I think we might do this again next week. Can you please prepare
something on reform of insanity? 
Student: Er...
36 Per Lord Nicholls for the majority at paragraph 27. See
also Lords Bingham and Hoffman at paragraph 44 and
Lord Carswell at paragraph 77.
37 Report on Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No
290) (2004) (Cm 6301).
38 Ibid. paragraph 3.110. See also paragraph 3.127: “The
test under our proposal is not whether the defendant’s
conduct was reasonable, but whether it was conduct
which a person of ordinary temperament might have
been driven to commit (not a bigot or a person with an
unusually short fuse). We believe that a jury would be
able to grasp and apply this idea in a common-sense way.
Because the test is not whether the defendant’s conduct
was reasonable, there is no illogicality in providing only
a partial defence.”
39 Ibid. at paragraph 3.168, Principle 1. In Principle 2 the
Commission went on to explain the objective element:
“In deciding whether a person of ordinary temperament
in the circumstances of the defendant might have acted
in the same or a similar way, the court should take into
account the defendant’s age and all the circumstances of
the defendant other than matters whose only relevance to
the defendant’s conduct is that they bear simply on his or
her general capacity for self-control.”
40 Law Commission Consultation Paper no. 177, A New
Homicide Act for England and Wales? (2005)
41 Ibid. paragraphs 10.7 and 10.23.
42 Report on Partial Defences to Murder, op. cit.
paragraph 3.166.
43 See for example, the criticism of the Law Commission’s
proposals by Mackay and Mitchell, “But is this
provocation? Some thoughts on the Law Commission’s
report on Partial Defences to Murder” [2005] Crim. L.
R. 43.
